Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin, presenting Israel's Plan for Self-rule for Judea, Samaria and Gaza, 28 December 1977
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset.
On the establishment of peace we shall propose to grant administrative self-rule to the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District on the basis of the following:
(Mr. Begin then read out the plan for self-rule for Judea, Samaria and Gaza - see below).
Mr. Speaker, I must now explain paragraph 11 of this plan and also paragraph 24. In paragraph 11 of our plan we stated that security and public order in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities. Without this paragraph the plan for administrative self-rule is meaningless. I wish to state from the Knesset rostrum that it obviously includes the stationing of Israel army forces in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. It is quite out of the question - if we had been asked to withdraw our army forces from Judea, Samaria and Gaza - to allow these areas to be dominated by the murderers' organization known as the PLO - "Ashaf" in Hebrew translation. This is the vilest organization of murderers in history, with the exception of the Nazi armed organizations. A few days ago it also boasted of the murder of Hamdi el-Kadi, the deputy director of the education office in Ramallah, and today it threatens to solve the problems of the Middle East by one bullet to be dispatched to the heart of Egyptian President Sadat, as its predecessors did in the Al-Aksa Mosque against King Abdullah - with one bullet. No wonder the Egyptian government announced that if one such bullet is fired Egypt will reply with a million bullets.
We want to say that this organization will not be permitted, under any conditions, to dominate Judea, Samaria and Gaza. If we did withdraw our forces, that is what would happen. And therefore let it be known that anyone who wants an agreement with us should be good enough to accept our statement that the Israel Defence Forces will be stationed in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; and there will also be other security arrangements so that we shall give all the residents - Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel - security of life, that is, security for all.
In paragraph 24 we stated:
"Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it Proposes, for the sake of the agreement of the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open."
We explained this to U.S. President Carter and to Egyptian President Sadat. We have a right and a claim of sovereignty to these areas of the Land of Israel. This is our country, and it belongs by right to the Jewish people. We want agreement and peace. We know that there are at least two other claims of sovereignty over these areas. If there is a mutual will to achieve an agreement and bring about peace, what is the way? If these conflicting claims are upheld and if there is no solution to the conflict between them, there can be no agreement between the parties. And for this reason, to facilitate agreement and to make peace, there is only one way: to decide, by agreement, that the question of sovereignty remains open; and to deal with the people, the nations - for the Palestinian Arabs, administrative self-rule; and for the Palestinian Jews, real security. This is the fairness contained in the proposal, and thus it has also been received abroad.
With this plan, as well as with principles which I shall now explain, for the settlement of relations between Israel and Egypt to be laid down in a peace treaty between these two countries, I went to the United States to visit President Carter and to inform him of both parts of our peace plan. The second part - namely, the principles for the settlement of the relations between Egypt and Israel in the context of a peace treaty - are:
* Demilitarization - The Egyptian army shall not cross the Gidi-Mitla line. Between the Suez Canal and this line the agreement for the thinning out of forces shall remain in force.
* Jewish settlements shall remain in place. These settlements will be linked with Israel's administration and courts. They will be protected by an Israeli force - and I repeat this sentence for a reason well known to all the members of the House - they will be protected by an Israeli force.
* A transition period of a number of years, during which IDF forces will be stationed on a defensive line in central Sinai, and airfields and early-warning installations will be maintained, until the withdrawal of our forces to the international boundary.
* Guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, which will be recognized by both countries in a special declaration as an international waterway which must be open to all passage of all ships under any flag; either by a UN force which cannot be withdrawn except with the agreement of both countries and by unanimous decision of the Security Council, or by joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols.
With the two parts of this peace plan I came to the President of the United States, Mr. Carter. I had a personal tete-a-tete with him. Both during that talk and in the talks between the Israeli and American delegations, he expressed a favourable assessment of the plan. On Saturday evening, at the second meeting, the President of the United States said that this plan was a fair basis for peace negotiations. A favourable view of our plan was also expressed by Vice-President Mondale; Secretary of State Vance; the President's adviser on national security, Prof. Brzezinski; as well as by the well-known, distinguished and influential Senators Jackson, Case, Javits, Stone and our dear friend - to whom, Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the entire Knesset of Israel I today extend best wishes for a full and speedy recovery - Senator Humphrey. In addition, a favourable assessment of this plan was expressed by former U.S. President Gerald Ford, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the spokesman of the American Jewish community, Rabbi Dr. Schindler. All of them stated that the basis of the plan was its fairness.
From America, en route home, I stopped over in London, and I presented our two-part peace plan to the Prime Minister of Britain and the British Foreign Secretary. Both Mr. Callaghan and Dr. Owen expressed their favourable assessment of our peace plan, and Mr. Callaghan told our Attorney-General that this was a very constructive plan. I also conveyed the plan to the special envoy of the President of the French Republic, Giscard d'Estaign, namely Francois Poncet.
While I was in the U.S., I asked the Secretary of State to contact President Sadat and to inform him, on my behalf, that I would like to meet with him - whether in Cairo or in a neutral place, or, should he so desire, in Ismailiya. I mentioned a meeting in Ismailiya because we spoke of such a possibility with President Sadat when he visited Jerusalem.
The President of Egypt informed me, via the Secrtary of State, that he was choosing Ismailiya as the site of our meeting. I agreed. Thus, a few days after the conclusion of my mission in the U.S. and Britain, the meeting in Ismailiya took place.
Mr. Speaker, that was a successful meeting. Its success came with its opening. We held a personal talk, President Sadat and myself; and within the first five minutes of that talk, the decisive result was attained: continuation of the negotiations between the two countries for the signing of a peace treaty - as was decided, instead of the expression "peace agreement," in the meeting between the two delegations in Ismailiya.
These negotiations will be conducted at a high level. The committees will be: political, to sit in Jerusalem, and military, which will sit in Cairo. The chairman of the committees will be the foreign ministers and the defence ministers of Egypt and Israel. The chairmanship of the committees will rotate. Our Foreign Minister will begin at the sessions of the committee in Jerusalem. The Egyptian defence minister will begin at the sessions of the military committee in Cairo. At the end of a week, the chairmen will rotate. The political committee will deal with the civilian settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and the subject which is a moral one, it may be termed an Arab-Jewish one - of the Palestinian Arabs. The military committee will deal with all the military questions connected with the peace treaty for the Sinai Peninsula.
Thus Mr. Speaker, for the first time in 30 years, in the very near future - in about another two weeks - direct, face-to-face negotiations will commence between authorized representatives - ministers of Israel - and Egypt's authorized representatives, its foreign and defence ministers. No third person will serve as chairman of these committees, as was the custom in all the meetings between ourselves and the Arab states; but the ministers themselves will conduct the sessions and rotate as chairmen. These will be fundamental, detailed, political, security negotiations for the attainment and signing of peace treaties.
And because this is happening for the first time since the establishment of our state, for the first time after five wars, for the first time after the declaration from various directions that Israel must be liquidated - we must welcome this shift in itself. And let us hope and wish that during the weeks or months during which the committees will sit, they will reach agreement - and if there is an agreement it will serve as a basis for the peace treaty which, in this case, will be signed by authorized representatives of Israel and Egypt.
It may be said that at the Ismailiya meeting the two sides also agreed on a joint declaration. But its publication was prevented because the two delegations did not arrive at an agreed and, joint formula for the problem which we term -and justly so - the question of the Palestinian Arabs, while the Egyptians call it, in their terminology - and it is their right to use their terminology - the question of the Palestinian people. We tried, we made an effort, to arrive at a joint formula; but it emerged that we could not accept one or another wording - whether proposed to the Egyptian delegation by us, or whether proposed to the Israeli delegation by the Egyptians. On Sunday, between 10 and 10.30 p.m., we therefore postponed the meeting until Monday morning, on the assumption that, with an effort by both sides, a way out would be found. And, indeed, it was found.
By way of agreement on a joint formula, in accordance with precedents in international conferences, we proposed -and our proposal was accepted - that each side would assert its position and employ its own terminology. Hence, the statement on the question of the Palestinian Arabs, as read out by the President of Egypt to our joint press conference, was made up of two sections, namely:
"The position of Egypt is that a Palestinian state should be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The position of Israel is that the Palestinian Arabs residing in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district should enjoy self-rule.''
Because of the difference over this issue, publication was prevented of the declaration whose contents had been completely agreed upon. We did not deem it proper to press for publication of a joint statement if the Egyptian side said that under these conditions it could not sign it. But I must note that the content itself was agreed upon by the two delegations together. (Interjection by Knesset Member Aharon Yadlin, of the Alignment: What is left of the contents?) If it was not published, why do so from the Knesset rostrum? (Interjection by Knesset Member Yadlin: How can settlements be defended by an Israeli force if the IDF withdraws to the international border?) That belongs to the debate - and I have learned, especially from committee proceedings - that if someone says he does not understand, he means he does not agree - particularly someone as intelligent as yourself.
Mr. Speaker, with the conclusions of the meeting at Ismailiya, we have done our part; we have given our share. Henceforth, the other side has the floor. For the sake of peace, for the sake of a peace treaty, we have assumed great responsibility and taken many risks. Yes, indeed. And already during these days, since my return from the U.S., a hard and painful debate has been under way between my best friends and myself. From the Knesset rostrum, too, I shall state, as I told them, that if it is my lot to conduct such a debate, I shall willingly accept the decree. They are my friends. We went a long way together, in difficult days and in good days. I love them, and regard them - and shall continue to regard them - with affection.
But there is no escape. You must accept responsibility with that degree of civic courage without which there can be no political decisions. To me it is clear that we are on the right path to facilitate negotiations for, and the signing of, a peace treaty. After examining all the other ways, as they have often been mentioned in Knesset debates, I no longer have the slightest doubt that the only way to make negotiations for the signing of a peace treaty possible is the one that is proposed by the government. Therefore, should it be necessary to face a debate on this matter with dear, even beloved, friends, we shall do so. But it is a fact that the responsibility is great and the risks exist. Therefore I reiterate: In Ismailiya, in the wake of the visits to Washington and London, we, the government of Israel, did our part, we made our contribution; and it is now the turn of the other side. If the followers of routine thinking in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry assume that they will succeed in getting international pressure exerted on us, so that we will accept their positions which are unacceptable to us, and that we will agree to them - they are wrong. Even if pressure were to be exerted on us, Mr. Speaker, it would be of no benefit to anyone, because we are used to pressure and the refusal to yield to it.
But I am convinced that no international pressure will be exerted on the State of Israel. It is inconceivable. The persons who praised our peace plan as fair, as constructive, as a breakthrough, are very serious persons. They know its full contents, except for certain amendments -which we have also transmitted to our friends the Americans which do not alter the substance of the plan. This is the plan I made known to President Carter and President Sadat. And they cannot, by invitation of the conventional thinkers of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, change their minds within the space of a few weeks. We have today massive moral support throughout the U.S.: in the administration; in both Houses of Congress - and the House majority leader, Mr. Wright, told me that he praises and approves this peace plan; in American public opinion; and last, but not least, among the American Jewish community.
Therefore the conventional thinkers in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry are making a great mistake if they are under the illusion that if we do not accept their antiquated formulae, which are totally divorced from reality, then international pressure will be exerted on us. It will not. And we shall continue on our path, to bring peace to the people of Israel, to establish peace in the Middle East. For that is my aspiration - not from May and June 1977, but ever since November and December 1947, from the days in which - after a break in the relations of peace between the Palestinian Arabs and the Palestinian Jews the first bullet, directed by an Arab hand into a Jewish heart, was fired, and from the days in which I appealed to the Palestinian Arabs from the underground, and called upon them: do not shed Jewish blood, let us build the country together, so that it may be a glorious land for the two peoples. But the bloodshed continued and there were five bloody wars to which we want to put an end by establishing peace and signing peace treaties. This is our heart's desire. And I am certain, Mr. Speaker, that I can express the view of the entire house - with the exception, perhaps, of one faction - if I say: This is the heart's desire of the entire Jewish people - to bring peace to the land, having liberated the land.
Israel's self-rule plan
Self-rule for Palestinian Arabs, Residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District, which will be instituted upon the Establishment of Peace:
1. The administration of the military government in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be abolished.
2. In Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district administrative autonomy of the residents, by and for them, will be established.
3. The residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will elect an Administrative Council composed of 11 members. The Administrative Council will operate in accordance with the principles laid down in this paper.
4. Any resident 18 years old or over, without distinction of citizenship, including stateless residents, is entitled to vote in the elections to the Administrative Council.
5. Any resident whose name is included in the list of candidates for the Administrative Council and who, on the day the list is submitted, is 25 years old or over, is eligible to be elected to the council.
6. The Administrative Council will be elected by general, direct, personal, equal, and secret ballot.
7. The period of office of the Administrative Council will be four years from the day of its election.
8. The Administrative Council will sit in Bethlehem.
9. All the administrative affairs relating to the Arab residents of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the direction and within the competence of the Administrative Council.
10. The Administrative Council will operate the following departments: education; religious affairs; finance; transportation; construction and housing; industry, commerce, and tourism; agriculture; health; labour and social welfare; rehabilitation of refugees; and the department for the administration of justice and the supervision of the local police forces. It will also promulgate regulations relating to the operation of these departments.
11. Security and public order in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities.
12. The Administrative Council will elect its own chairman.
13. The first session of the Administrative Council will be convened 30 days after the publication of the election results.
14. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, without distinction of citizenship, including stateless residents, will be granted free choice of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship.
15. A resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who requests Israeli citizenship will be granted such citizenship in accordance with the citizenship law of the state.
16. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the right of free option, choose Israeli citizenship, will be entitled to vote for, and be elected to, the Knesset in accordance with the election law.
17. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who are citizens of Jordan or who, in accordance with the right of free option, become citizens of Jordan, will elect and be eligible for election to the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in accordance with the election law of that country.
18. Questions arising from the vote to the Jordanian Parliament by residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be clarified in negotiations between Israel and Jordan.
19. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan, and the Administrative Council to examine existing legislation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district; and to determine which legislation will continue in force, which will be abolished, and what will be the competence of the Administrative Council to promulgate regulations. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.
20. Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, who, in accordance with the free option granted them, become Israeli citizens, will be entitled to acquire land and settle in Israel.
21. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan, and the Administrative Council to determine norms of immigration to the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. The committee will determine the norms whereby Arab refugees residing outside Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be permitted to immigrate to these areas in reasonable numbers. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.
22. Residents of Israel and residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be assured freedom of movement and freedom of economic activity in Israel, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.
23. The Administrative Council will appoint one of its members to represent the council before the government of Israel for deliberation on matters of common interest, and one of its members to represent the council before the government of Jordan for deliberation on matters of common interest.
24. Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open.
25. With regard to the administration of the holy places of the three religions in Jerusalem, a special proposal will be drawn up and submitted that will include the guarantee of freedom of access to members of all faiths to the shrines holy to them.
26. These principles will be subject to review after a five-year period.
Points from reply by Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the Knesset debate of 28 December 1977.
When Secretary of State Vance was in Israel I said to him, "What about a meeting with President Sadat?" and he said: "He would like to meet you too." When I visited Rumania in August, and had talks with Ceaucescu, I raised the possibility of a meeting with the Egyptian President, and he said that in the present stage he would prefer a meeting between representatives, but a personal meeting was also possible. When President Sadat went to Rumania.... President Ceaucescu recommended the meeting to him... we were not surprised, there was no shock.
Geula Cohen should ask herself: Perhaps she is wrong? Perhaps this is a good plan, not a bad one? Perhaps it is a Zionist plan and not a danger to the Zionist enterprise? Perhaps this is a plan for a powerful momentum of settlement, and not the stoppage of settlement?
For the first time there is an Israeli peace plan. The whole world is arguing about the Israeli plan, for and against... I am well aware of the power of the Soviet Union.... and yet I say: The support of the United States is more important than the opposition of the Soviet Union... we used to be isolated in America and Europe, and now we isolate someone else. This is a most important development...
And now I will tell you about two moments in the Ismailiya conference, in which I was prepared to say to the Egyptian President "Non possimus" and to tell my colleagues to be ready to go back home... at a certain moment we were asked to accept a proposal that Israel undertakes to withdraw from Judea, Samaria, Sinai, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the preamble to Resolution 242 emphasizing "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The debate was dramatic... I told President Sadat that we are in Sinai today in a perfectly legitimate way... 242 does not commit Israel to such a withdrawal, and therefore we shall not sign such a declaration... and we were ready to say: If so, we cannot continue. It was agreed that this paragraph should be eliminated from the joint statement, and we were able to carry on and prepare a joint statement.
A second moment was when we were called upon... to state that we agreed to establish a so-called Palestinian State in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. And again we said: On no account will we accept this. This would be a deadly danger to the State of Israel... It would also be a danger to Jordan - "And also a danger to you, Mr. President" - and a danger to the free world, because of the experience of airlifts to Angola and Mozambique and Ethiopia, for the flight-time from Odessa to Bethlehem is less than two hours.
And now I want to explain why we proposed a free choice of citizenship, including Israeli citizenship... again the answer is: Fairness... we never wanted to be like Rhodesia. And this is a way to show our fairness to all men of goodwill... here we propose total equality of rights - anti -racialism... - of course, if they chose such citizenship... we do not force our citizenship on anyone.
Someone tried to be clever and said: This is just a further interim settlement. There is no basis for this... in general, reconsideration is possible even before five years have passed. Everyone can make proposals, the Jordanian government can propose, the government of Israel can do it, the administrative council can do it: Let us consider, perhaps we can add something, or take away something. Actually, this framework of five years is quite incidental... but the agreement is something new - responsible administration of affairs by the residents in Judea and Samaria and Gaza through their elected representatives. This is the meaning of self-rule, and that is why the idea captured the imagination of people in the free world...
And now I shall discuss the concept of "territorial compromise," with which a part of this house has simply fallen in love: Since I fell in love with my wife, I have never seen such love... what is territorial compromise? One part to them and a part to me... it transpires that territorial compromise is the obstacle to peace. If we came to Sadat and told him you will have to sign, and inform the entire Arab world that you agree... to the Jordan rift being under Israeli sovereignty, he would say, on his part, "Non possimus." Thus our idea facilitates agreement and peace, leaving the question of sovereignty open... and so an agreement can be arrived at... the dogmatic, routine, fossilized talk of territorial compromise frustrates every prospect and possibility of conducting negotiations...
(Interjection: Will there be a plebiscite when the time comes to decide?) There is nothing in our laws about a plebiscite... if there is a majority for a plebiscite I shall of course accept the Knesset's legislation. I have heard that some people propose new elections: I am ready...
Mr. Speaker, the debate has ended. I ask for a vote, and I ask that each and every member of the Knesset, without distinction of faction, vote according to his conscience. There is no imposition, no coercion. I am confident of the result.
The vote was 64 in favor, 8 against, 40 abstentions.
SOURCES:
and The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record, 1967-1990, ed. Yehuda Lukacs, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 153–55.
