Of all the many policies our citizens deserve -- and need -- to understand, none is so important as those related to our topic today -- the uses of military power. Deterrence will work only if the Soviets understand our clear commitment to keeping the peace ... and only from a well-informed public can we expect to have that national will and commitment.
So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps the most important question concerning keeping the peace. Under what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out or national policy?
National power has many components. [...]
In today's world, the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then lay 2-3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States was protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.
Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid conflict, while maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has always been to work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war comes. [...]
Because we face a spectrum of threats -- from covert aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation, the use of brute force -- choosing the appropriate level of response is difficult. [...] The outcome of decisions on whether -- and when -- and to what degree -- to use combat forces abroad has never been more important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to ignore.
[...] Some reject entirely the question of whether any force can ever be used abroad. [...] On the other side, some theorists argue that military force can be brought to bear in any crisis. [...] Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or satisfactory solutions. [...] We must be capable of quickly determining that [masked or indirect] threats or conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of the United States and our allies ... and then respond accordingly. [...] When our vital national interests and those of our allies are at stake, we cannot ignore our safety, or forsake our allies.
At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom. [...] On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the United States has seen the need to join forces with other nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with negotiations, and by separating warring parties. [...] In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a peacekeeping mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for combat [...]
In those cases where our national interests require us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our resolution. [...] Just as clearly, there are other situations where United States combat forces should not be used.
I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. [...]
(1) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. [...]
(2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. [...]
(3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. [...]
(4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. [...] We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic question: "Is this conflict in our national interests?" [...]
(5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. [...] We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas. [...]
(6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. [...]
SOURCE: Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, New York: Warner Books, 1990, Appendix, 445-57; extract available at
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Department-of-Defense-Caspar-weinberger-on-military-power.html
